Syria & Societal Roles: Female Underemployment
The lack of female participation in the labor force, as in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, presents a problem for female access to quality education. Though the Ba’ath regime promised full participation for women in the workplace when it seized political control in 1963, many Syrian women finish primary school, but never enter the labor force. In 2010, Syria ranked quite close to last for female participation in the labor force (Dervis 315). Those that do start working around the age of 12 are likely to leave around age 20 (Huitfeldt 12). However, as evident in Table 11, an even greater proportion is likely to never even seek employment in the first place. However, those women that do continue their education to the secondary or tertiary level are much more likely to enter the labor force; furthermore, marginal rates of return in reported wages per year of additional public schooling for Syrian females can be up to 18 percent (Huitfeldt 23). Even in light of this encouraging trend for Syrian women who continue their education, most drop out after primary school.
Though a free, public, segregated education is open to women, and since the Assad regime they have been gradually entering the labor forces in increased numbers, “social attitudes have changed more slowly, leading to significant divergence between the ideal and the actual status of Syrian women, most of whom profess Islam but whose opportunities may be shaped as much or more social class, education, residence, and economic means” (Shaaban 101). While Islam is the official religion of Syria, its vaguely secular laws leave a lot of gray area that has led to the denial of access to quality education, equal share in the labor force, and even equality via personal status laws for women. Because of the political coexistence of both secularists and Islamists in the Syrian government, “each immediately lists its fear of the other as a pretext for its reluctance to act” on any particular issue of civil society (Shaaban 103). In this way, the political gray areas have been exploited so that there is no national conversation in Syria about why women, who are allowed to attend school, do not do so past the mandatory level.
One reason that has been cited for this is the difficult nature of the curriculum, coupled with its irrelevance to the needs of female students, who are unlikely to enter the workforce (Mehrah 47). Furthermore, prevalent punishment and unfavorable conditions in schools lead to Syrian girls fearing the formal education environment, and making a personal decision not to continue their education (Mehrah 50). Another possible explanation is family poverty, and therefore the need for children to drop out of school and help with finances, as in Egypt. Some Syrian parents feel that there is no use for formal education for their daughters’ “future functions”; namely, homemaking skills that are easily taught at home. This especially contributes to the drop-out rate of girls from school after the primary level, as Syrian girls are likely to become child brides.
UNICEF defines child marriage as “a formal marriage or informal union before age 18” (UNICEF, “Child marriage”). In 2006, 17.7 percent of Syrian girls were married before age 18; 3.4 percent of these were married before age 15 (Central Bureau of Statistics). However, these rates are likely much higher in reality, as many Syrian marriages are unregistered (Save the Children 12). This rate declines with every level of education: 23.4 percent of girls whose mothers have only primary education are married before age 18, while this rate drops to just 2.3 percent of girls whose mothers complete secondary education (Central Bureau of Statistics). Early marriage is often necessary for poor families, who cannot afford to continue to support or even feed their daughters (Save the Children 5). As in Egypt, marriage is a way to reduce financial burden on Syrian families. However, poor girls who are married young are likely to remain poor, be unable to finish their educations, and eventually have their own daughters in the same situation. Other Syrian families agree to young marriages for their daughters because they believe it will benefit them by providing more male protection: "Where there is only one man in the household, many Syrian [families] report feeling that this is not sufficient protection for women and girls – especially if that man has to leave the home regularly (for example, to collect food or to work). […G]eneral insecurity and sexual harassment are commonly reported as reasons for arranging for girls to be married at a young age. Parents see child marriage as a way to protect their daughters – and their family’s honour – from possible sexual assault and other kinds of hardship" (Save the Children 4).
Whatever the individual motivation, the phenomenon of child marriage influences Syrian families to pull their daughters out of school after the primary level. However, the average age of marriage for Syrian girls is 25 (UNICEF). This means that even those women that remain in school are extremely likely to be married soon after completion of either the secondary or tertiary level of education, and thus are unlikely to enter the workforce. This reinforces the societal roles of Syrian girls as wives and mothers rather than as students, and restricts their access to equal, quality education. Many are forced to drop out after the primary level for a variety of reasons related to the social safety of their families. As in Egypt, a revision of legislation and social security practices in Syria could aid this problem. The lack of enforcement of codes that make women equal in the labor force, and able to receive an equal pension, also present an obstacle to women’s education, as poor families have no incentive to encourage their daughters to remain in school.
